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Learning to modulate one’s own brain activity is the fundament of neurofeedback
(NF) applications. Besides the neural networks directly involved in the generation and
modulation of the neurophysiological parameter being specifically trained, more general
determinants of NF efficacy such as self-referential processes and cognitive control
have been frequently disregarded. Nonetheless, deeper insight into these cognitive
mechanisms and their neuronal underpinnings sheds light on various open NF related
questions concerning individual differences, brain-computer interface (BCI) illiteracy as
well as a more general model of NF learning. In this context, we investigated the
neuronal substrate of these more general regulatory mechanisms that are engaged when
participants believe that they are receiving NF. Twenty healthy participants (40–63 years,
10 female) performed a sham NF paradigm during fMRI scanning. All participants were
novices to NF-experiments and were instructed to voluntarily modulate their own brain
activity based on a visual display of moving color bars. However, the bar depicted a
recording and not the actual brain activity of participants. Reports collected at the end
of the experiment indicate that participants were unaware of the sham feedback. In
comparison to a passive watching condition, bilateral insula, anterior cingulate cortex and
supplementary motor and dorsomedial and lateral prefrontal areas were activated when
participants actively tried to control the bar. In contrast, when merely watching moving
bars, increased activation in the left angular gyrus was observed. These results show that
the intention to control a moving bar is sufficient to engage a broad frontoparietal and
cingulo-opercular network involved in cognitive control. The results of the present study
indicate that tasks such as those generally employed in NF training recruit the neuronal
correlates of cognitive control even when only sham NF is presented.
Keywords: cognitive control, anterior insula, neurofeedback, fMRI, self-awareness
INTRODUCTION
Neurofeedback (NF) is a kind of biofeedback with the primary
goal of helping the user to gain control over specific prede-
fined aspects of his/her brain activity. In typical NF protocols,
brain activity is depicted and fed back in real-time to the users.
Real-time feedback allows for rewarding desirable patterns of
brain activity with visual, auditory or even tactile stimulation and
consequently teaching how to control brain activity (Coben and
Evans, 2010). NF is employed quite frequently as a treatment for
several clinical disorders such as attention and hyperactivity dis-
orders, depression, autism etc. (Lévesque et al., 2006; Angelakis
et al., 2007; Coben and Padolsky, 2007; Gevensleben et al., 2009;
Niv, 2013). Besides that, NF has become especially interest-
ing for training and improving different cognitive abilities such
as working memory and attention (Egner and Gruzelier, 2001,
2004; Vernon et al., 2003; Vernon, 2005). Even sport (Landers
et al., 1991) and artistic performances (Gruzelier et al., 2010)
are one of the main areas for using NF to enhance performance
(Vernon, 2005).
There are several neurophysiological methods to provide NF,
such as real-time fMRI, MEG and functional near infrared spec-
troscopy or even invasive methods such as electrocorticograms
(e.g., Kober et al., 2013b; Ruiz et al., 2013b; Sulzer et al., 2013b).
For instance, the application of real-time fMRI is growing and
evolving rapidly (for reviews see e.g., Ruiz et al., 2013a; Sulzer
et al., 2013a). However, especially regarding the feedback speed
and the depicted brain signal, EEG NF and real-time fMRI differs
significantly (e.g., Sulzer et al., 2013a).
Regardless of whichmethod is employed to provide NF, several
aspects of NF learning are constant. An increased degree of atten-
tion to the inner state to be learned by NF, a reduction of motor
activity and artifacts, general relaxation, concentration, etc., are
necessary to learn from NF. Moreover, the usually vague verbal
strategies given to participants keep a high degree of similarity
across different NF protocols: participants are generally asked to
relax and concentrate on the feedback regardless of the exact neu-
rophysiological parameter being trained (Kropotov, 2009). It is
recognized that implicit learning mechanisms play an important
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part in regulating brain activity (e.g., Birbaumer et al., 2013).
Birbaumer and colleagues propose that brain-self-regulation is
not necessarily an explicit and conscious process and is very sim-
ilar to skill learning. For instance, real-time fMRI studies show
that not only pure operant learning (e.g., Shibata et al., 2012), but
also mental imagery and explicit strategies (Kober et al., 2013a,b;
Ruiz et al., 2013b) empower participants to self-regulate different
brain regions (for reviews see e.g., Birbaumer et al., 2013; Sulzer
et al., 2013a). The interplay between skill learning and conscious
processes in NF is still poorly understood and themeaning of con-
trol over brain activity behind these two processes differs in a very
fundamental way. While skill learning describes how specific net-
works in the brain are modulated by NF on their own activity,
explicit processes have a much more general function. Explicit
processing and cognitive control may help to calibrate the activa-
tion in the rest of the brain through executive processes with the
view of not disturbing the networks learning from NF. Hitherto,
there is no framework integrating into a unified neurocognitive
model this dissimilar collection of aspects of NF learning. In face
of the large interest in NF and its good reputation (AAP, 2013), it
is necessary that more fundamental principles of NF learning as
well as its more general neuronal correlates can be distinguished
(Kropotov, 2009).
It is known that explicit learning mechanisms and top-down
processes can have a substantial impact on implicit or bottom-
up mechanisms (Shallice and Cooper, 2011), however, research
on NF is scarce regarding the influence of top-down processing
and cognitive control on NF learning. Therefore, in the present
study, we aimed to go a step forward toward the understanding of
explicit control mechanisms related to NF learning. Particularly,
the neural correlates of self-referential processes such as the atten-
tion to inner states as well as cognitive control during a NF-like
task will be investigated.
A closer inspection of the structure of NF setup reveals that
this skill depends directly on focusing attention on internal states.
This implies the ability to reduce the attention to external events
and concentrate over a determined period of time on internal
states. Other cognitive states such as meditation (e.g., Lazar et al.,
2005; Farb et al., 2007) and mind wandering (e.g., Mason et al.,
2007; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011) are paradigmatic regarding
the focusing of attention to internal states. Several studies show
that the anterior part of the insula plays a part in attention to and
the awareness of internal cues (Barrett et al., 2004; Critchley et al.,
2004; Pollatos et al., 2007). Accordingly, learning from NF is most
likely dependent on a strong subjective momentary interoceptive
sensory process of the participant.
Another central aspect of NF is the perception of control over
brain activity. When participants believe to have control over
a NF protocol, they refer to the feeling of causing the action,
meaning that the participants believe they are able to control the
NF in an appropriate way. In the literature this phenomenon is
called agency (Gallagher, 2000). Agency plays an important role
in self-consciousness and tells us whether an action is caused by
ourselves or other entities (Gallagher, 2000; Newen and Vogeley,
2003). Recently, the anterior insula has been identified as a central
hub for self-agency (Sperduti et al., 2011). As mentioned above,
the primary goal of NF is to gain control over specific predefined
aspects of the brain activity. Due to the immediate feedback in
conventional NF protocols, self-agency and agency in general,
respectively, could play an important part in NF trainings.
Self-referential processes such as agency and self-awareness
play an important role in gaining control over brain activity.
Therefore, brain regions supporting interoceptive attention such
as cingulate cortex, supplementary motor area, dorsomedial and
lateral prefrontal areas and especially the insula, as a hub for self-
referential processes, can be relevant for NF training because they
are involved in the regulation of neuronal activity in many other
regions of the brain, which may both favor or hinder NF learning.
Evidence suggests that different forms of control (e.g., overcom-
ing cognitive interference, adjusting performance after making an
error, inhibiting a prepotent response, regulating one’s drug crav-
ing, etc.; for reviews see e.g., Miller, 2000;Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Kana et al., 2007; Dosenbach et al., 2008; Garavan et al., 2013;
Power and Petersen, 2013) engage at least partly overlapping brain
networks. So it is plausible that the subjective feeling emerging
when one is engaged in a task which demands learning from feed-
back will be accompanied by the activation in brain areas involved
in cognitive control.
To our knowledge, no studies have examined hitherto the neu-
ronal correlates of cognitive control under the belief of training
neurofeedback. In this study we examine the cognitive mecha-
nisms and neuronal underpinnings of perceived levels of control
over NF applications. In this context, our main goal was to inves-
tigate the brain activations observed when participants have the
intention to control a moving bar, a task such as those generally
employed in NF training. Since we are interested in the neural
networks associated with the belief of control in a NF situation
and not in the capacity to learn from NF, no real NF protocol was
employed in the present study but rather a condition of realistic
but fake feedback. In most of the published NF studies, partic-
ipants do not have a very well specified representation of how
to modulate or influence the NF paradigm (e.g., Vernon et al.,
2003; Gruzelier et al., 2010; Weber et al., 2011; van Boxtel et al.,
2012). For this reason we expected to elicit genuine control beliefs
regarding NF regulation in our participants. Sham NF was pre-
sented in form of moving bars, which according to instructions
were representing participants’ brain activity in a very realistic
way. To examine neural correlates of participants’ attempts to
control the NF interface, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) was employed. Every participant received exactly the same
visual feedback. With this methodological approach, we were
able to examine the neurophysiological response on the partici-
pants’ attempt to interact with a NF-like paradigm, independent
of individual success rates or better and worse performers in gen-
eral. Additionally, we were interested in how much control beliefs
affect neurophysiological and behavioral correlates of NF learn-
ing. For that we have used questionnaires assessing control beliefs
while dealing with technology in general.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty volunteers [10 male, 10 female, age range 40–63 years;
mean age = 46.4 years; standard deviation (SD) = 5.14] par-
ticipated in the experiment after giving informed consent. All
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 914 | 2
Ninaus et al. Cognitive control during assumptive neurofeedback
participants were naïve to the purpose of the study, had nor-
mal or corrected to normal vision and presented no history of
major medical illness, neurological or psychiatric disorder, or
substance abuse. At the end of the experiment, participants were
informed that the feedback presented in fMRI was not related to
their brain activation but was a mere recording. The experimental




There were three different block designed modeled conditions:
in the experimental condition (“get control”), participants were
instructed to get control over the movement of the bar by using
their brain activity. In the two control conditions, participants
were instructed to watch passively the bars. In one control con-
dition (“watch moving bars”) the bars were moving like in the
“get control” condition and in the other control condition the
bars were static (“watch static bars”). Each condition was repeated
five times. At the beginning of each trial a cross-hair has been
presented for about 18.5 s (jittered from 17 to 20 s). Following
this, participants received the visual cues “control” or “watch”
for 3 s to get ready for the three different conditions. No action
was required in this part of the trial. In the next part of the trial
the participants were able to see three different bars. In the “get
control”- condition, participants were instructed to try to con-
trol the bars during a time interval of 20 s and, at the end of each
interval, to rate their perceived success controlling the bars after-
wards on a 5-point rating scale (no control—full control). In the
“watch moving bars” and the “watch static bars” conditions, par-
ticipants were instructed to watch passively the screen for 20 s.
The timing and the visual appearance of a trial is also shown in
Figure 1.
The experimental task was conceived to resemble as closely
as possible a genuine NF training session. At the beginning of
the session, participants were told that they would take part in a
training study and that they should use the visual feedback given
by a moving bar displayed inside the fMRI scanner to voluntar-
ily modulate their own brain activity according to the feedback.
On a feedback screen participants were able to see three dif-
ferent bars (see Figure 1). They were instructed to increase the
middle bar and decrease the left and right bar. The participants
have not received an explicit strategy on how to gain control
over the feedback and therefore our approach is comparable with
conventional EEG NF instructions (e.g., see Kober et al., 2013a;
Witte et al., 2013). The instructions were the same as those our
lab uses in the training of SMR frequency in EEG (Witte et al.,
2013). Participants were instructed to relax and keep concen-
trated for the time period of experimental blocks and to use the
pauses between them to recover. More specific strategies about
how participants were supposed to comply with the instructions
were not provided. The visual display was a recording of differ-
ent sessions of SMR NF training with EEG. Participants were
not informed about the exact meaning of the different bars but
only that it was important for them to succeed that the cen-
tral bar should be kept as high as possible and the two lateral
bars as low as possible. The animation of the bars was updated
20 times per second and produced by sampling authentic EEG
signal of persons undergoing NF training. Therefore, the move-
ments were naturalistic and representative of a typical NF session
in both “watch moving bars” and “get control” conditions. Data
selected for the production of stimuli were filtered to eliminate
movement and eye artifacts. Search for artifacts was conducted
by two independent and experienced EEG analysts. This signal
was smoothed with a moving average of 1 s so that jumps in
signal were avoided. At themoment of fMRI data acquisition, par-
ticipants were unaware that they got sham feedback. With this
methodological approach we were able to examine the neuro-
physiological response on the participants’ efforts to gain control
over their own brain activity.
Locus of control for technology
After the fMRI session, participants were asked to fill out
several questionnaires. The “locus of control for technology”-
questionnaire (KUT; Beier, 2004) was used to assess control
beliefs while dealing with technology. The KUT-questionnaire
asks the participants to rate, on a 5-point Likert-scale, their han-
dling of technology on 8 items (range of score: 8–40). More
precisely the KUT-questionnaire assesses the specific interaction
with technical environments of users (e.g., “I really enjoy finding
a solution for technological problems”; “Most of the technologi-
cal problems that I have to face can be solved by myself.”). The
FIGURE 1 | (A) Example of a complete trial of the “watch moving/static bars” condition; (B) Example of a complete trial of the “get control” condition;
participants were instructed to try to control the movements of the bars during functional MRI measurement.
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questionnaire is available in German and has a high reliability
(α = 0.89; Beier, 1999). Recently, Witte et al. (2013) showed that
control beliefs, assessed with the KUT-questionnaire can predict
the ability to control a NF. Furthermore, Burde and Blankertz
(2006) demonstrated in a BCI-study that the higher the score in
the KUT questionnaire was the better was the BCI performance.
Rumination scales
Rumination, a method of coping with negative mood that
involves self-focused attention as well as self-reflection (Morrow
and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema,
1993), was assessed with the short version of the Ruminative
Response Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003). The RRS is a self-
reported measure of rumination consisting of 10 items, and it
relates to different components of rumination: reflective ponder-
ing and brooding. The first, reflective pondering is an adaptive
type of rumination that describes the degree of engagement in
cognitive problem solving recruited to improve mood. Depressive
brooding is a maladaptive type of rumination which reflects the
focus on the meaning and symptoms of distress (De Lissnyder
et al., 2012).
MRI DATA ACQUISITION
Neuroimaging data were acquired with a 3.0 Tesla Siemens Skyra
MRI scanner at the MRI-Lab Graz (Austria) using a 32 channel
head coil and parallel imaging with an iPAT acceleration fac-
tor of 2. Functional images were acquired using a T2∗ weighted
gradient-echo pulse imaging sequence (TR = 920ms; TE =
30ms, flip angle = 72◦; 64 × 64 matrix; voxel dimensions =
4 × 4 × 4mm), providing whole brain coverage in 23 slices.
The participants were positioned comfortably in a supine
orientation with their head located in the head coil. Foam
padding was used around the head to minimize head movements.
Participants wore earplugs to reduce discomfort due to scan-
ner noise. Participants viewed the experimental protocol on a
screen, via a mirror attached to the head coil. Behavioral mea-
sures (ratings) were collected via a MR compatible response box.
Participants were required to press the buttons under their index
finger and ring finger to navigate through the rating possibilities
and to confirm their decision, participants had to press the button
under their middle finger.
fMRI DATA ANALYSIS
Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For the preprocessing of the
functional MRI images we used the “MoCo”-series provided by
Siemens (Siemens, www.medical.siemens.com), which were cor-
rected retrospectively for intrascan movement. The fMRI-data
were then realigned using the first scan as a reference to which
all subsequent scans are realigned. Slice time correction was
performed. A mean image created from the realigned volumes
was spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) EPI brain template (SPM8). The derived spatial transfor-
mation was then applied to the realigned and slice time corrected
T2∗ volumes, which were finally spatially smoothed to facilitate
group level statistics with a Gaussian kernel of 8-mm FWHM.
Statistical models were constructed on the basis of the general
linear model implemented in SPM8: all conditions fixation point,
cue, “watch static bars,” “watch moving bars,” “get control,” and
rating were modeled as block design conditions in a single design
matrix. Contrasts were estimated for each participant individu-
ally in a first level analysis and statistically tested in second level
analyses. Of primary interest for this study were the contrasts of
“get control”> “watch moving bars” and “watch moving bars”>
“get control.” Also reported were the contrasts “watch moving
bars” > “watch static bars” and “watch moving bars” < “watch
static bars.” Whole brain analysis results are reported at a thresh-
old of p < 0.001 uncorrected and p < 0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons on cluster-level [false discovery rate (FDR)] with a
minimum cluster size of 10 voxels. All reported coordinates are
reported in MNI space.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Participants had to rate their success controlling the bars on a 5-
point rating scale (1 = no control to 5 = full control). The mean
rating of success of all participants was 3 (3 = medium control;
mean rating= 2.69; SD = 0.66; Range: 1–4; Table 1). None of the
participants reported that they were aware of the sham feedback
during a debrief session.
The average score on the KUT-questionnaire of the partici-
pants was 31.4 (SD = 5.61;Minimum= 20,Maximum= 38). On
the RRS questionnaire, participants had an average score of 12.85
(SD = 2.98) for the component reflection and 10.35 (SD = 2.76)
for the component brooding (Table 1).
To address the relation between performance rating, control
beliefs while dealing with technology and rumination, Pearson
correlations were calculated (Table 1). A significant negative cor-
relation was found between the performance rating and KUT-
scores.
NEUROIMAGING RESULTS
Whole brain analysis results are reported at a threshold of p <
0.001 uncorrected in pictures and p < 0.05 corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons on cluster-level [false discovery rate (FDR)]
with a minimum cluster size of 10 voxels in tables. All reported
coordinates are reported in MNI space (Table 2; Figure 2).
To examine the extent to which self-referential processes are
relevant for the perceived level of control over a NF-like task, we
contrasted the conditions “get control” and “watch moving bars.”
Importantly, this contrast revealed several highly significant acti-
vation clusters. A widespread activation has been identified in
frontal areas with its peak in the left anterior part of the insula.
Additionally, a large cluster of activation including the right insula
dorsomedial and lateral prefrontal and bilateral supplementary
motor area as well as the anterior part of the cingulate gyrus.
Furthermore, this comparison also revealed significant cluster
activation in the right superior parietal lobe, right middle frontal
gyrus, left supramarginal gyrus and left thalamus. The corre-
sponding Brodmann areas of these significant activation clusters
are listed in Table 2. In contrast during the simply watching trials,
compared to attempt of controlling the bars, significant acti-
vation has been identified only in left angular gyrus (Table 2;
Figure 2).
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Table 1 | Correlation between performance rating, control beliefs, and rumination.
Results correlations Means SD
Rating KUT RRS
Reflection Brooding
Rating 1.00 2.69 0.66
KUT −0.46* 1.00 31.40 5.61
RRS 0.01 0.02 1.00 23.20 2.84
Reflection −0.16 0.19 0.55* 1.00 12.85 2.98
Brooding 0.19 −0.18 0.43 −0.51* 1.00 10.35 2.76
KUT, “locus of control while dealing with technology”-questionnaire; RRS, Ruminative Response Scale; *p < 0.05.
Table 2 | Brain regions preferentially activated when attempting to get control over moving color bars compared to when passively watching
the moving color bars.
Brodmann areas Voxels Peak T -value
x y z
“get control” > “watch moving bars”
L insula
- R insula
- L precentral gyrus
- dorsomedial and lateral prefrontal area
- bilateral supplementary motor area
- L anterior cingulate gyrus
- R pars opercularis
6, 13, 32, 9, 47, 44, 24,
46, 10, 45, 22, 8, 4, 38,
3748 −30 23 1 7.87
R sup. parietal lobe 7 229 18 −64 49 5.60
R middle frontal gyrus 9, 10, 46 110 39 41 40 4.07
L thalamus 149 −15 −10 −2 4.98
L supramarginal gyrus 40 114 −57 −37 34 4.67
“watch moving bars” > “get control”
L angular gyrus 39 90 −48 −70 28 7.91
Reported coordinates in MNI space; L, left; R, right; p < 0.001 uncorrected on voxel-level, p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons on cluster-level [false
discovery rate (FDR)]; minimum cluster size 10 voxels.
To determine the general level of activation when participants
observed a moving bar, we used the contrasts of “watch mov-
ing bars” > “watch static bars” and “watch static bars” > “watch
moving bars.” A broad network of activation covering the right
and left temporo-parietal and inferior frontal areas was observed
after subtracting the activity of “watch static bar” from “watch
moving bars” (Table 3, Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate the neural basis of
participants’ subjective experience when they believe to have con-
trol over an external device and use visual feedback. To be able
to disentangle the effect of subjective experience from learning
from NF, we hold learning rates constant by using sham feed-
back. Participants were instructed to try to get control over a
moving bar presented on the screen in the same way as in a real
training session with NF. A large network involving the ante-
rior insula, bilaterally, right operculum, ventral, dorsomedial and
-lateral prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal lobule, supplementary
motor area and anterior cingulate cortices was more activated
when participants actively engaged in the task to move the bar
than when they passively watched the bar movements. Moreover,
the perceived ability to control the bar during the fMRI measure-
ment correlated negatively with control believes toward electronic
devices. In the following, these results will be discussed in more
detail.
PERFORMANCE RATING
Debrief performed after the fMRI measurement revealed that no
participant questioned the veracity of the feedback obtained in
the “watch moving bars” and “get control” conditions. The rat-
ing provided by participants after finishing each run of the “get
control” condition reveals that participants were actively engaged
in the task of trying to get control over the movements of the bar
presented on the screen. Average scores in the rating were close to
the absolute arithmetical mean of the rating interval employed.
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FIGURE 2 | transversal slices (4mm spacing); t-score map for “get control” “watch moving bars”; p < 0.001 uncorrected on voxel-level, p < 0.05
corrected for multiple comparisons on cluster-level [false discovery rate (FDR)]; minimum cluster size 10 voxels.
Table 3 | Brain regions preferentially activated when observing moving color bars compared to static color bars (low level control condition).
Brodmann areas Voxels Peak T -value
x y z
“watch moving bars” > “watch static bars”
R temporal cortex, inferior and superior
parietal cortex, fusiform gyrus, posterior
insula
7, 40, 19, 37, 41, 39, 13,
5, 42, 22
2236 48 −61 1 8.99
L middle occipital gyrus 37, 19, 39 328 −51 −76 1 7.92
L superior parietal lobule 7, 40 364 −30 −52 55 6.05
R inferior frontal gyrus 9, 6, 45, 10, 47, 46, 44, 8 1439 39 23 28 5.89
L supramarginal gyrus 40, 39 280 −60 −52 28 5.15
L precentral gyrus 6, 9, 8 264 −42 −1 52 5.10
“watch static bars” > “watch moving bars”
No significant activation cluster
Reported coordinates in MNI space; L, left; R, right; p < 0.001 uncorrected on voxel-level, p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons on cluster-level [false
discovery rate (FDR)]; minimum cluster size 10 voxels.
This can be interpreted as evidence that most participants per-
ceived their ability to control the bar as superior to the chance
level. Interestingly, these ratings also were negatively correlated
with the control believes toward electronic devices as reported in
the KUT scale. These results show that the higher the perceived
ability to control electronic devices (i.e., operate a computer or
a mobile phone), the lower the perceived ability to control the
moving bar during the experiment. Those participants reporting
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FIGURE 3 | transversal slices (8mm spacing); t-score map for “watch
moving bars” > “watch static bars”; p < 0.001 uncorrected on
voxel-level, p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons on
cluster-level (false discovery rate [FDR]); minimum cluster size 10
voxels.
higher control believes toward electronics correctly assessed the
levels of control over the bar, which was definitely not under
their control, as lower. This suggests that the higher the lev-
els of perceived control reported by participants in general, the
higher were also the expectations regarding the capacity to control
one’s own brain activity and consequently to learn from NF. In
participants with high expectations regarding their performance
controlling the bar the frustration as expressed by the low rat-
ings was more pronounced. In general, the perception about the
general ability to control electronic devices seems to be a determi-
nant of the perceived success of NF learning (see also Witte et al.,
2013).
In the present study, most participants reported moderate lev-
els of perceived control over bar movements when in reality they
had absolutely no control over it. One could argue that these
results are due to the complete absence of valid feedback to par-
ticipants. However, results from double-blind NF studies (e.g.,
Witte et al., 2013) reveal that a similar pattern is observed also
when real NF is applied. In these studies, most participants receiv-
ing either real or sham NF are not able to guess to which group
they were assigned even after many successful training sessions.
This shows that even when NF is applied, the perception of con-
trol is not accurate in NF tasks. To the contrary, perception of
control in NF tasks is inaccurate most of the time during training
because thresholds are adjusted on a regular basis and individual
performance is very variable across sessions. Therefore, it is of pri-
mordial interest to detect the brain networks related to believed
control. In the following section these results will be discussed in
more detail.
THE NEURONAL TOPOGRAPHY OF COGNITIVE CONTROL IN A
NEUROFEEDBACK-LIKE PARADIGM
To our knowledge, this is the first study which examines the neu-
ral correlates of executive control in a NF-like paradigm using
fMRI. In comparison to the control condition “watch static bars,”
stronger activation in a broad network of regions distributed over
the right temporal cortex, inferior and superior parietal cortex,
fusiform gyrus, posterior insula, left middle occipital gyrus, left
superior parietal lobule, right inferior frontal gyrus, left supra-
marginal gyrus and left precentral gyrus was observed in the con-
dition “watchmoving bars.” The activations observed in occipital,
temporal and parietal cortex reflect probably the processing of
bar movements (Burr and Morrone, 2012), while the activations
observed in the inferior frontal gyrus, bilaterally, reflect probably
an increase of attention to inner states (Craig, 2009), since in this
condition participants were told that they were seeing their own
brain activity represented by the moving bar.
To investigate the specific correlates of trying to get control
over the bar movements, the conditions “get control” and “watch
moving bars” were compared directly. This contrast allows for
the interpretation of those neural correlates of cognitive control
recruited in situations comparable to NF training uncontam-
inated by the processing of movement, since the bars moved
according to the same principles and in comparable amount in
both conditions.
The neuroanatomical structure showing the strongest activa-
tion in the contrast “get control” > “watch the bar” was the
bilateral anterior insula, which is mainly responsible for driv-
ing attention to specific inner states. Our results suggest that
the insula is providing the circuitry related to cognitive con-
trol with a reference against which to compare the incoming
information from visual feedback. Based on the match or mis-
match between these two pieces of information, the structures
related to cognitive control continuously calibrate cognitive acti-
vation in an effort to improve the match between feedback and
inner states (Dosenbach et al., 2007). Since feedback was not
genuine, the mismatch between inner and external states was con-
stant and cognitive control had to be continuously applied in
the “get control” condition. NF learning requires the participants
to focus on their own physiological states but the information
of their inner state is provided by an external medium (e.g.,
visual display, auditory feedback etc.). Hence, this process is facil-
itated by the engagement of cognitive resources dedicated to
self-referential processes to integrate this external information
into the self.
In other words, the participation of the anterior insula in
the present study may be understood as a central hub, which
compares and integrates the external information provided by
the feedback display with internal information regarding brain
activity (Craig, 2009). The feedback, when effective, would enable
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participants to learn the mental representation of the interrela-
tionship between oneself and the feedback bars in the immediate
moment. Therefore, NF could be seen as an embodied tool,
meaning that the users embody the provided feedback into their
self, in a comparable way as in the BCI literature (e.g., O’Hara
et al., 2011; Heersmink, 2013).
Along with the importance of the insula in integrating infor-
mation provided by the feedback into self-related processes, the
participation of anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex during the “get control” shed further light onto the neu-
ral bases of the process of NF learning. NF requires participants
to compare the actual state with the desired state of the feedback
to be able to learn how to get control over the NF paradigm. The
anterior cingulate cortex is known to be associated to detect dis-
crepancies between an actual and a desired state (Carter et al.,
2000; Kerns et al., 2004), self-reflection (Herwig et al., 2012) and
to tuning attentional processes (Bishop et al., 2004) with direct
connections to thalamus, insular cortex, amygdala, parietal and
prefrontal areas (Goldman-Rakic, 1988). Describing these func-
tions of the anterior cingulate cortex highlights the importance of
this region for NF regardless of the content of specific NF training
programs.
ATTENTION-NETWORK UNDER THE BELIEF OF GETTING
NEUROFEEDBACK TRAINING
Besides the increase in bilateral insula activation during the “get
control” condition, activation in the right pars opercularis of
the inferior frontal gyrus and right middle frontal gyrus was
observed. In several studies, those two regions are associated
with stimulus-driven attention and the maintaining of atten-
tion (e.g., Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Weissman et al., 2006).
Furthermore, the whole brain analysis revealed activation in
several regions associated with cognitive control, such as dor-
somedial and lateral prefrontal areas. During the “get control”
condition, participants had to sustain their attention toward
internal and external sources over a period of time. Along with
the identified activation in right pars opercularis, and right mid-
dle frontal gyrus and dorsomedial and lateral prefrontal areas we
have found activation in a brain structure closely associated with
the left thalamus. Those brain areas are critical for processing
internal states (Miller and Cohen, 2001) and therefore could play
a critical role in acquiring control over a NF paradigm. Further
evidence that the participants were highly engaged in acquiring
control over the bars and shifted their attention toward the sham
NF is the significant bilateral activation in the supplementary
motor area, especially in context with the significant activation
in anterior cingulate cortex and thalamus during the “get con-
trol” condition. Those regions provide signals that support the
brain’s moment-to-moment information processing and form a
centralized control system (Dosenbach et al., 2007). Regarding
our paradigm, where participants had to constantly integrate
the provided information from the moving bars, the identified
regions apparently play a major role in driving the regulation of
inner states with the aim of regulating the movements of the bar.
However, we cannot rule out that the bilateral activation in the
supplementary motor area emerged due to anticipation of motor
response during the “get control” condition since participants
were asked to rate their performance after the feedback in the “get
control” condition.
LEFT ANGULAR GYRUS
The contrast between “watchmoving bars” and “get control” con-
dition revealed only one significant activation cluster with its peak
in the ventral part of the left angular gyrus. Seghier (Seghier et al.,
2010; Seghier, 2013) proposed that this part of the left angular
gyrus is associated with the default mode network. Therefore,
left angular gyrus is prominent during rest and when persons
are not engaged in external interactions (Buckner et al., 2008)
and is interrupted during effortful tasks (Binder et al., 1999;
Seghier et al., 2010). Our result implicates that the participants
did not try to gain control or interact with feedback during the
“watchmoving bars” condition, which supports our experimental
setup.
However, a meta-analysis about different brain structures
related to self- and external-agency conducted by Sperduti and
colleagues (Sperduti et al., 2011) revealed that the left angular
gyrus is also part of the external agency attribution network.
During the “watch moving bars”-condition the participants may
have experienced that the displayed moving bars are rather not
caused by them than during the “get control” condition.
CONTROL BELIEFS MAY INFLUENCE NEUROFEEDBACK LEARNING
As outlined so far, NF training is linked to interoceptive and self-
referential processes. In contrast to NF trainings, in most of the
brain computer interface studies participants get a quite concrete
instruction about how they are able to control the interface or
what mental task they should use. The common mental tasks
are motor imagery, mental subtraction etc. (e.g., Friedrich et al.,
2012) to yield highly distinguishable brain patterns. It has been
shown that control beliefs toward technology can be used as a
predictor of brain computer interface performance. Burde and
Blankertz (2006) showed that the higher the KUT results were the
better was the brain computer interface performance. Due to the
fact that gaining control over a NF especially in the early stages
of a training mostly relies on “trial-and-error” learning and that
the participants do not receive a concrete instruction about how
to modulate the NF paradigm, it is not surprisingly that the KUT
score in the present study negatively correlates with ratings of the
participants after a “get control” trial. Participants with a higher
KUT score may expect that they are able to deal well with the NF
paradigm form the beginning. These participants have the most
reasons to be disappointed with their performance and therefore
rate their success to control the NF lower than participants with
a lower KUT score and lower expectations regarding the outcome
(see also Witte et al., 2013). These findings could also imply that
participants who are highly convinced handling technology well
struggle the most with getting control over a NF. In a recent study,
Kober et al. (2013a) showed that some strategies employed by NF
participants may lead to a cognitive overload, which prevents NF
learning. Due to the repeated attempts by those persons to get
control over the NF, they may impede themselves by trying too
hard and are therefore not able to direct their attention on the
quite subtle internal bodily cues, especially at the early stages of
the training.
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SUMMARY
In summary, we used fMRI to identify brain regions associated
with believed control in a task similar to NF learning. Because
of the use of sham feedback only, the activations observed in
the present study are due to differences in believed control and
were not affected by specific NF learning processes. The sig-
nificant activation in the anterior insular and cingulate cortex
suggests that participants actively tried to get control over the
moving bar in the “get control” condition. Behavioral data addi-
tionally showed a negative correlation between the subjective
estimates about the amount of control perceived in the “get
control” condition and control beliefs.
The present study reveals the neuronal networks related to
general regulatory processes associated with NF settings. We
assume that especially regions relevant for self-referential pro-
cesses such as self-awareness and self-agency play an important
part in acquiring control over a NF, due to the fact that partic-
ipants have to focus on their own physiological signals, which
requires a big amount of self-referential cognitive load.
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